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Abstract
Ministerial advisers were first formally appointed as support for individual
Irish ministers in 1973, and since then their numbers and tasks have
considerably expanded. As ‘temporary civil servants’, they are regarded as
both an accepted and criticised feature of executive government. This article
focuses on the role of political staff during the period 2011–16 and centres on
the period of the economic crisis and its immediate aftermath. It considers
themes arising in the international literature that raise questions for the
reform of the Irish ‘special adviser’. In order to unpack the specifics of the
Irish case, the position and function of special advisers are explored through
two theoretical perspectives – public adviser bargains and the core executive.
It is argued that the special adviser continues to fit somewhat uneasily within
the imperatives of the political-administrative system because they are
personally appointed by ministers and their selection is determined by the
level and type of support required by individual ministers, as opposed to any
preordained skills set.
Keywords: Special adviser, minister, core executive, public service bargain
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Introduction
‘I see Irish public administration as being stuck between some
idealised … Westminster-type system and some other model it is
transitioning towards but never quite getting there.’ This comment
arose in a conversation with an adviser who served in the Fine
Gael/Labour government of 2011–16. Although the reference pertains
to the wider systemic features of the political and administrative
landscape, one may consider how the role of political advisers, often
referred to as special advisers, forms part of the political reform
agenda. These ‘temporary civil servants’ are politically appointed and
personally selected by ministers. In several countries, including
Ireland, they work alongside the permanent civil service to enhance
political support for individual ministers and strengthen the capacity
of the executive (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2015). Political advisers are not
bound by the conventions of political impartiality and therefore
present as both a solution and a problem in terms of political-
administrative relations, which in turn presents a challenge for
political reform.
This article considers the role of political staff during the period
2011–16. The discussion centres on the period of the economic crisis,
its immediate aftermath and the activities of political advisers in the
Fine Gael/Labour government elected in February 2011. Firstly, the
role of Irish special advisers is contextualised with reference to the
reform themes identified in the international literature on political
staff. Secondly, the question of how Irish special advisers were
included in the government reform agenda is addressed, and their
position and function is explored through two theoretical perspectives
– public service bargains (PSBs) (Hood & Lodge, 2006) and core
executive studies (Dunleavy & Rhodes, 1990). The former focuses on
issues of political-administrative relations and the introduction of
public adviser bargains (PABs) (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2016). Core
executive studies enable a view of advisers’ inputs to the functioning of
executive government (Craft, 2015; Shaw & Eichbaum, 2015). A focus
on functions, particularly in the context of the economic crisis,
expands the discussion beyond the normative considerations of
political-administrative relations and in turn encompasses different
types of relationships across the executive. It is argued that the special
adviser continues to fit somewhat uneasily within the Irish political-
administrative system because they are unique actors and their
appointment is determined by the level and type of support required
by individual ministers. 
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Ministerial advisers in Westminster systems and beyond 
There are two broad reasons why ministerial advisers are appointed:
they contribute to improving the responsiveness of governments and
they have the potential to play a strategic role, together with public
servants, in designing policies and proposing reforms (OECD, 2010).
Advisers are personally appointed by a minister and stand outside the
normal hierarchical management structure of a ministry. Concern
about controlling their impact and actions is often reflected in
concerns about regulating their numbers and introducing instruments
such as a code of conduct. In addition, the literature on the countries
derived from the Westminster tradition focuses on both advisers’
positive input into the policymaking process (Shaw & Eichbaum, 
2015; Yong & Hazell, 2014) and their controversial association with
policy fiascos (Tiernan, 2007). A recent direction in this literature has
been to broaden the focus of political adviser research to diverse
traditions in Europe and beyond (Di Mascio & Natalini, 2013;
Gouglas, 2015; Öhberg et al., 2017), coupled with attention to cognate
literature on policy analysis/public administration models (Craft,
2015). Extending the analysis beyond the Westminster group of
countries illustrates more examples of different institutional prefer -
ences, how advisers work with civil servants/politicians and what
functions they undertake.
In countries of the Westminster genre the special adviser, or
‘SpAd’, has prompted a robust discussion about how the ‘people who
live in the dark’ exert political influence but also impact on the civil
service system and the convention of ministerial responsibility. These
issues have encountered a greater degree of scrutiny in the UK (Yong
& Hazell, 2014) than in Ireland. For example, Tony Blair’s Labour
administration invoked a sceptical attitude towards departmental
officials, and senior advisers had the authority to funnel instructions
and perform executive functions. This did not lead to productive
relationships with civil servants (Laughrin, 2014, p. 82), and these
scenarios led to an inquiry by a parliamentary select committee tasked
with clarifying these associations (Hood & Lodge, 2006, p. 128). In
contrast, continental European countries and Scandinavia have
different ways of structuring partisan policy advice/assistance and
political appointees’ involvement in governing. This is illustrated by
the staffing within ministerial cabinets, political civil servants and
special advisers’ appointments (De Visscher & Salomonsen, 2013;
Rouban, 2012). 
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In the UK and Ireland the historical development of the legal
framework regulating public sector labour relations leads back to the
Northcote–Trevelyan Report of 1854. A more contemporary
interpretation of these issues is the Hood & Lodge (2006) framework
of PSBs, which analyses the relationships between politicians and
public servants as the outcome of a political exchange. This highlights
the implicit and explicit arrangements in which politicians gain an
element of loyalty, expertise and competency from public servants
and, conversely, the public servants secure a place in the government
structure with commitments regarding protection, responsibility and
rewards. As the literature indicates, the advent of advisers has
implications for this bargain – they can be viewed as participating in a
ménage à trois, with repercussions for political-administrative relations
(De Visscher & Salomonsen, 2013, p. 72), and as another factor
leading to the downgrading of civil/public servants’ advisory roles
(Lodge, 2010, p. 105) in a post New Public Management policy
environment. The nature of the bargain applying to political advisers
themselves is unclear and, as the commentary above indicates, the
literature has generally situated the adviser as an independent variable
influencing the core minister/senior official bargain. Shaw &
Eichbaum (2016) scrutinise this through the deployment of the
reward, competence and loyalty dimensions of what they call PABs
between ministers and the political adviser. Overall, it is accepted that
the bargain requires advisers to play an essential supporting role to
ministers. In a 24-hour media environment ministers also appoint
advisers to take care of their communications and profile. The role is
fluid and indefinite, which makes prescriptions for reforming or
constructing a PAB less clear-cut.
Further questions, and ones of interest for reform, are how the
adviser role manifests in structures and how institutional change
affects the senior civil service. For example, in 1984 the Labour
government in Australia opted to reconfigure the institution of
ministerial offices and employed a large staff complement composed
entirely of partisans (Maley, 2015, p. 3). The government acted to
assert ministerial control and removed neutral public servants from
ministers’ offices. In countries of the Napoleonic tradition, however,
the adviser entourage resides in ministerial cabinets which are distinct
structures and may be characterised by a tendency to exclude civil
servants from policy work, as is the case in Belgium. Any move to
employ a cabinet model to non-ministerial cabinet systems implies
empowering advisers with executive authority and creating
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implications for the secretary general’s position in a department. Yet
the increase in staff around prime ministers’ offices and the UK
proposal to develop extended ministerial offices (Cabinet Office,
2013; Yong & Hazell, 2014) suggest some potential movement
towards ‘cabinetisation’ in non-ministerial cabinet systems, albeit slow
and gradual (Gouglas & Brans, 2016). In addition, Europeanisation,
along with the experience of observing the European commissioners’
cabinets and liaising with other member state administrations/political
parties, broadens awareness of the institutional options available to
politicians. In view of this, ‘the study of ministerial cabinet system
advisers could enlighten other administrative and executive traditions
that have been witnessing or dealing with such “cabinetisation”
pressures’ (Gouglas at al., 2015, p. 1).
A less radical institutional approach is hiring advisers to oversee
party business and provide coordination for government within
structures at the centre of government (see Peters et al., 2000). To this
end, advisers contribute to the operation of the core executive, which
acknowledges the broader range of individuals and institutions
involved in central policymaking, the key functions for integrating
central government policy and the ability to mediate conflict between
the various elements of the government machine (Dunleavy &
Rhodes, 1990). Arguably, the core executive focus on function offers
the potential to further an analysis of the ministerial adviser who is a
coordinator ‘type’ (see Connaughton, 2010a, 2015). Taking into
account the international literature’s emphasis on advisers’ bargains,
locations and functions, the following section provides a context and
methodology for exploring the Irish case during 2011–16.
Context and case selection: Drivers for the appointment of
political advisers in Ireland 
Political advisers offer potential assistance to improve government
responsiveness in terms of politics and policy. However, research
indicates that advisers’ actions can expose difficulties in addressing the
quagmire of responsibilities present in the shadowlands between
politics and administration (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010; Tiernan, 2007).
Therefore, it may be argued that advisers present both a solution and
a problem in terms of the design and operation of political-
administrative relations. In Ireland the routine appointment of
advisers was chiefly advanced from 1973 onwards and its organisation
was influenced by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s ‘special
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adviser experiment’ commencing in the 1960s (see Blick, 2004). The
first cohort of Irish political staff were recruited in 1973 amid a
realisation that modernisation necessitated political resources and, in
turn, led to greater pressures on ministers’ workloads. Garret
FitzGerald was the only Fine Gael minister to appoint an adviser and
he chose an economist, using a rationale that he could make a better
contribution in government if someone with different skills would
undertake research for him (personal interview). 
The appointment of individual special advisers continued until
1992, when a successful electoral result and desire to introduce
government reforms motivated Labour to explore new institutional
innovations and alternatives in coalition government to a reliance on
the civil service for policy advice and management (Farrell, 1994). The
result was the introduction of the programme manager system,
whereby ‘programme managers’ worked alongside civil servants and
focused on the implementation of an official programme for
government both across government departments and within political
parties (see O’Halpin, 1997). In addition to the new management
structure, ministers also appointed special advisers. The positions
coincided until 1997, when the ministerial programme managers were
withdrawn by the incoming Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats
coalition. Only the Taoiseach and Tánaiste had programme managers,
and the government reverted to individual advisers serving ministers
in a personal capacity and without formalised structures
(Connaughton, 2010b). From 1997 onwards, an emphasis was placed
on the role of ministers of state (junior ministers), whose numbers
substantially increased. 
Typically, advisers serve as an ‘extension of the minister’ in the Irish
case (O’Toole & Dooney, 2009) and work in proximity to civil servants
in government departments. Overall, there appear to be two principal
drivers for the promotion of special advisers. Firstly, there is the
requirement to complement a generalist civil service with more
specialist expertise, while also ensuring that civil servants remain
politically neutral. Secondly, coalition governments have become
regularised in Ireland, bringing with them different party preferences
for using staff resources in directing the government agenda and
supporting ministers. Both drivers raise important political reform
issues in terms of the rules, structures and functions underpinning
advisers’ roles. The first driver presents issues pertaining to political
exchange and to where advisers fit in the relationship between civil
servants and ministers. This provides a rationale for exploring the
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concept of a PAB in the Irish context. The second driver, the
continuity of coalition governments, highlights the significance of
function and coordination across government. This prompts questions
about how advisers serve to integrate government business with other
actors and structures within the core executive.
Both approaches are now explored in a review of advisers’
employment during the 2011–16 Fine Gael/Labour coalition
government, in order to unpack their role, how they served the
coalition and the implications for reform. The context is elaborated by
two interviews in 2008 with a former Taoiseach/minister and a former
programme manager.1 The analysis of the case is supported by
interviews undertaken with two secretaries general and six special
advisers who served ministers between 2011–16.2
Political advisers and the Fine Gael/Labour coalition, 2011–16
The Fine Gael/Labour coalition took office in March 2011, following
the international markets’ loss of confidence in the Irish sovereign and
in the aftermath of the adoption of the rescue package from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), in liaison with the European
Central Bank (ECB) and European Commission (EC), announced on
28 November 2010. During the election campaign both parties
emphasised the significance of reforming the political system and
dealing effectively with the crisis. Both factors provided immediate
challenges in government. The crisis had placed the overall policy
advisory system under critical review (Fitzgerald, 2012), whereby it
was acknowledged that the capacity to cope with exposure to risk was
undoubtedly shaped by existing national policy frameworks,
institutions and processes which did not adequately protect the
economy and society (NESC, 2009). Although their roles are varied,
the cohort of political staff appointments play a role in this system,
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1 The quotes selected are derived from earlier research on special advisers and
programme managers for a study on ministerial advisers in the Fianna Fáil/Progressive
Democrats government of 2002–07, and from interviews undertaken with advisers in the
2011–16 Fine Gael/Labour government. Interview, Dr Garret FitzGerald (February
2008); interview, former programme manager (February 2008).
2 Secretary general (October 2013); secretary general (October 2013); special adviser,
Labour Party (October 2013); special adviser, Fine Gael (October 2013); special
adviser, Labour Party (November 2013); special adviser, Labour Party (November
2013); special adviser, Labour Party (November 2013); special adviser, Fine Gael
(December 2013).
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raising questions about the effectiveness of their contributions. Cuts to
support staff in constituency offices and a promise of ending
appointments of unqualified partisan appointees to paid positions in
state boards were advocated during the election. Dealing effectively
with the crisis was also linked to implementing the troika programme
and exiting the bailout. 
When questioned in Dáil Éireann on 29 March 2011, the
Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, TD, stated that the total number of political
appointments would be fewer than in the previous administration, and
their remuneration considerably less. He employed a standard
response to a question on what his advisers would do: ‘The primary
function of special advisers will be to secure the achievement of
Government objectives and to ensure effective co-ordination in the
implementation of the programme for government’ (Dáil Éireann,
2011). There was no suggestion of unveiling a radical new departure
for the system of political advisers or of a return to the programme
manager system. 
Both Fine Gael and Labour had previously been in coalition with
each other but neither party had been in government since 1997, and
few of the TDs had the experience of previously serving as ministers.
A number of advisers who held strong qualifications (particularly in
the economics sphere) were appointed but the majority did not
conform to the definition of an expert within the assigned
departmental portfolio. On the Fine Gael side, advisers represented
diverse backgrounds. Whereas in relation to Labour, several members
of the party held a view that their advisers should be committed to the
core values of the party rather than have a minister ‘collect them’
(personal interview). Unlike the selection criteria of their Fianna Fáil
predecessors, the appointment of civil servants to adviser roles was
exceptional. Interviewees referred to advisers acting as an ‘extension
of the minister’, ‘an extra pair of eyes and hands’, ‘this time more a
thinker than political organiser’; one also stated, ‘[I] help shape his
[the minister] agenda and use my contacts to achieve that goal’.
Public adviser bargains 
This section considers reform of the political adviser in Ireland from
the perspective of the PAB (competence, loyalty, rewards) and the
expectation that the number of advisers should be controlled.
Although the nature of the bargain for advisers remains unclear, the
PAB concept is a useful lens to unpack the features of their position
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from 2011. Irish advisers are absorbed within existing institutions with
two important exceptions – they are exempt from the requirement that
civil servants should be appointed on merit and they are not required
to be politically neutral. The role is underpinned by legislation in the
Public Management Service Act, 1997, and ministers are entitled to
two special advisers, whereas the Taoiseach, Tánaiste and leader of a
political party may appoint a larger team. A reduced number of
political advisers were employed by the Taoiseach in 2011 but all
ministers availed of the legislative entitlement to two special advisers,
and generally appointed them to ‘communications’ and ‘policy’ tasks.
Several advisers conforming to the ‘policy tsar’ title were appointed in
portfolios such as health. 
One of the challenges in defining the PAB for advisers in Ireland is
that it remains somewhat unclear as to what their advisory role is,
since it is so varied. This has important implications for the
competence aspect of PABs. It would appear the closest that political
parties have come to conceptualising this role is the programme
manager variant introduced by the Labour Party, or at least Labour
had the clearest idea of how the role could be collectively and
strategically utilised. Political advisers may offer partisan and/or
technical advice, and advisers do not present with a designated skills
set. They are selected by ministers for different reasons, and over time
some ministers have wanted glorified constituency gofers, policy
specialists, experts and predominantly good generalists to cover as
many bases as possible (Connaughton, 2010a, p. 354). 
For example, an adviser serving between 2011 and 2014 considered
his long career working as an education correspondent and critical
‘outsider’ as potential to adapt to the position. John Walshe’s book
relating his experience of serving as an adviser to the Labour minister
Ruairí Quinn is one of the rare accounts available on the work of Irish
special advisers. Walshe stresses that all of his fellow advisers came to
the job with a different set of skills and backgrounds, and viewed the
task in slightly different ways (Walshe, 2014, p. 12). He appeared to be
motivated by the opportunity to use his resources to help a reforming
minister make his imprint on policy (Walshe, 2014, p. 13). He
contrasts with the more overt party political stance of some
appointees, who strive to navigate the tension between the political
imperatives of the electoral cycle and the necessity to deliver practical
benefits to voters in the short term. Overall, appointments reflect the
fact that advisers are ‘selected by individual ministers by their
assessment of the political support they need’ (personal interview).
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This raises an issue for political reform since in reality the role is a
fluid and indefinite one, and inevitably this gives rise to the ‘mixed bag’
of adviser competence. But this is also the nature of the resource
across other country systems since it is ‘nigh on impossible to specify a
single definition of the term “political adviser” much less to capture
the differences between categories of advisers and their range’ (Shaw
& Eichbaum, 2016, p. 2). 
In Ireland advisers have a model contract, are subject to the Ethics
in Public Office Act, 1995, and are now designated public officials
under the Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2015. Through delegated
relationships, however, the role of adviser brings political staff into the
centre of the governing process, particularly those serving in the
Taoiseach and Tánaiste’s teams, and across departments and state
agencies. Acknowledging the competency of political staff goes
beyond a simple exchange of patronage for political loyalty. They learn
how government really works, and make contacts and networks that
yield capital later on. A downside of the role is the so-called ‘lotteries
of life’ bargain (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2016, p. 7), in that accepting the
role of special adviser involves risk. It is an uncertain career structure
that is linked to the minister’s time in office, and the job is lost if the
minister resigns or is not re-elected/assigned a ministerial portfolio.
When Eamon Gilmore resigned as leader of the Labour Party in the
aftermath of the local and European elections in 2014, the members of
his advisory team also lost their jobs (Gilmore, 2016, p. 289).
The ‘after-life’ experience of the political adviser raises important
questions about an appropriate detachment from the particulars of
government business or a gamekeeper role before taking up
alternative employment with interest groups or consultants. The
Regulation of Lobbying Act, 2015, now provides for a one-year
‘cooling-off’ period when senior public servants leave office in order to
avoid situations where they may directly begin lobbying for the private
sector in their previous public service work. Advisers may be subject to
a number of post-employment restrictions and may need to request a
waiver (that may also be subject to conditions), particularly if their
new employer is registered on the Register of Lobbying (see Murphy
in this issue for a more extended discussion).
As political advisers are personal appointments, competency will
continue to be variable. PABs also raise questions around the tensions
between loyalty and responsibility. In terms of loyalty, some may be
loyal ‘minders’ to their minister, some to the party, others may look to
see better public policy outcomes through their loyalty to a
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programme, and there are those who object to the term ‘partisan’ as
they see an opportunity to give loyal service to their country. But in the
PSB language it is clear that they are not ‘trustees’ acting as
independent adjudicators for the public interest and they are not
anonymous (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2016, p. 13). Loyalty to the minister is
expressed in personalist terms, though there have been examples
where ministers routinely failed to accept responsibility for their
advisers’ conduct (Tiernan, 2007). The legislative basis for special
advisers is contained within Section 11 of the Public Service
Management Act, 1997, whereas an effort to delineate their
boundaries is outlined in the Travers report of 2005, where it is made
clear that advisers should not become part of the line management of
a department. Commentators acknowledge that advisers have a place
in the Irish system but it is difficult to secure this in terms of the
models/traditional bargain. In terms of wider political reform, the
accountability arrangements of special advisers were included in the
work of the Independent Panel on Strengthening Civil Service
Accountability and Performance, formed in January 2014. The
subsequent report included a recommendation to put in place a formal
accountability code and mandatory induction training for special
advisers. This was incorporated into the Civil Service Renewal Plan,
launched at the end of 2014, and while an induction programme was
introduced for new advisers in 2016, the details of the proposed special
advisers’ code of conduct are not in the public domain. Although
complicated, a commitment to strengthening advisers’ accountability
and identifying boundaries of responsibility is necessary to eliminate
or minimise undue political influences on public administration, as
well as potential conflicts. 
Perhaps the most controversial element of the adviser bargain in
Ireland is the rewards. Advisers are not a homogeneous group and the
most obvious reward in securing the job is remuneration, though there
may be limited room for pay acceleration. The Department of Public
Expenditure and Reform guidelines stipulate that special advisers
should be paid on the principal officer pay scale for the civil service. In
2011 several advisers were paid substantially more than the recom -
mended guidelines, and while they may be high-calibre individuals
who previously held much better paid positions, this served as a
political own goal. The government underestimated the hostile
reaction from the media and the public to the government breaching
its own pay caps on advisers in an era of severe cuts to public services
and tax hikes. The justification that the salary scales and total pay bill
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were substantially less than those of their Fianna Fáil predecessors
rang hollow. In particular, the Labour Party should have foreseen this
scenario, anticipated the public reaction to ‘kitchen cabinets’ and set a
more realistic level of remuneration – as opposed to setting a bar for
pay and then breaking it. Cost had also been a critical factor in the
Labour-led programme manager experiment during the 1990s. As one
former programme manager commented in 2008, ‘I don’t think you
will ever see the same scale… folklore in the political mind [was] that
the programme managers attracted trouble; why go there and make
that hostage to fortune’ (personal interview). On the whole, a focus on
advisers’ pay has shaped discussions in the media regardless of
political party or coalition preference for the employment of this
actor. It is a knotty issue since advisers may forgo or place on hold
security of tenure, increments and pension in anticipation of a future
dividend, which may take the form of consultancy, politics, senior
public service or a more lucrative private sector position. It remains to
be seen whether the Irish political adviser really constitutes a political
apprentice, as personified by UK politicians such as David Cameron
or Ed Miliband (Reidy, 2016).
Core executive: Coordination and centralisation 
In this section the core executive literature is used to explore advisers’
contributions and whether the Irish administration’s response
conforms with expectations in the literature – namely, that an
economic crisis leads to strong political pressures for the use of central
authority and the tendency for decision-making to become more
politicised (Parrado, 2012). Arguably, the coordination of executive
activities in the Fine Gael/Labour administration required greater
attention due to the economic crisis, the troika programme and the
lasting impact of austerity on policy decisions. 
In accordance with Heffernan’s (2012) views, the distribution of
power within the Irish core executive is both relational and locational,
and the political advisers can be divided into performing two main sets
of activities: (i) implementation of the programme for government
and party/coalition relations, and (ii) shaping the policy agenda in the
department and political briefs. Through their services and
institutional proximity to ministers, political advisers have the
potential to add capacity to shape policy within the core executive. In
addition, in the Fine Gael/Labour administration it was critical that
coalition relations were managed since it was an environment where
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decisions were hard, and had real electoral and political consequences,
whereby audiences on a variety of levels – troika, EU, domestic – had
to be satisfied (personal interview). Unlike in 1992, Labour did not
have the same bargaining strength in 2011 in choosing which party
they would deal with, and they had to accept compromises with Fine
Gael on the assignment of key portfolios such as Finance (O’Malley,
2011, pp. 270–1). Labour was keen to have an impact on economic
policy and was concerned about the way the Department of Finance
had retreated into a silo and acted unilaterally in the period leading up
to the EC–ECB–IMF bail-out. During discussions on government
formation, senior aides with economic expertise were full members of
the party negotiating teams. The resulting agreement was to split the
Department of Finance into two departments, each headed by a senior
minister. The new Department of Public Expenditure and Reform was
given responsibility for spending in the public sector and reform
generally (see MacCarthaigh in this issue). An Economic Manage -
ment Council (EMC) was formed to set economic policy. 
Between 2011 and the end of 2013, both coalition parties applied
themselves assiduously to the implementation of the troika
programme. In his political memoir Eamon Gilmore, the Tánaiste and
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade during this period, outlined a
series of routine weekly meetings that cascaded between levels of key
party officials, senior advisers of all ministers, coalition counterparts
and Labour ministers, culminating in a meeting between Taoiseach
and Tánaiste prior to cabinet (see Gilmore, 2016, pp. 262–4). Each
item on the cabinet agenda was discussed and attempts were made to
resolve problematic issues between the parties. Senior advisers played
a key role in these deliberations and in securing consensus, i.e. pre-
political clearance on sensitive issues which exacerbated coalition
tensions. In terms of coordination, the Taoiseach’s programme
manager led the cabinet committee system from the Department of
the Taoiseach, and the Taoiseach’s chief of staff focused pre -
dominantly on assisting the Taoiseach as head of government and in
political coordination. This took the form of an overarching political
management role in terms of liaising with personnel in the department
and across the executive, party representatives and backbenchers on
the impact of policy decisions.
In terms of big policy issues, economic topics acquired a degree of
fixation during 2011–16. A substantial part of advisers’ time was
inevitably required to reduce the potential political fallout from tough
financial decisions (particularly around budget time). The EMC
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formed a select membership of party leaders (Taoiseach and
Tánaiste), Ministers for Finance and Public Expenditure and Reform,
and senior advisers (programme managers), and assumed a different
routine to other cabinet sub-committees. A Second Secretary General
in the Department of the Taoiseach (reporting to the Tánaiste) was
responsible for overseeing its work but the committee was not
supported by a parallel senior officials’ group, and fewer officials were
in attendance (unless by invitation). The EMC was largely driven by
advisers and represented a forum for resource exchange and strategic
decision-making to facilitate the communication between the two
finance ministers, who were central to advancing the requirements of
the troika programme and managing public finances. Of significance,
both parties sat on equal terms in the EMC and economic decisions
were made jointly (Gilmore, 2016; Leahy, 2013; private interviews).
Given the realities of budgetary constraints, the special advisers in
the post-2011 administration held more coordination responsibilities
generally. This included departmental reporting to the centre of
government, namely the Departments of the Taoiseach and of Public
Expenditure and Reform, and moving internally/communicating
externally policy reform programmes. With a team of assistant
secretaries, advisers also participated with ministers directly in the
cabinet sub-committee system established to ensure policy
deliverables. From the Taoiseach’s perspective, the committee system,
while not universally liked by Labour, was crucial to policy delivery,
and strict deadlines were set for progress reports at monthly meetings
(personal interview). The Tánaiste was served by a small team of
advisers with a presence in government buildings – a full office was not
at their disposal, which contrasted with the Office of Tánaiste, which
had existed under Dick Spring’s tenure as a Labour Tánaiste in
1992–7.
However, the dominant role of the Taoiseach and Tánaiste’s senior
advisers and the benefits of this form of coordination were not evident
to all. To observers outside the radius of government buildings,
instruments such as the EMC represented an accrual of power to the
centre, which did not exist in the previous administration (see Leahy,
2013; Walshe, 2014), and Fine Gael appeared to acquire dominance in
decision-making. The core EMC group defended its work, however,
and ministers and advisers both insisted that the committee did not
usurp cabinet but rather avoided paralysis in decision-making
processes (Howlin, 2014). The EMC did not leak its deliberations and
up to 2014 it considered complex economic and financial issues. This
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included the budget, which inevitably raised tensions between the
coalition partners; restructuring the banking system; the government’s
stance on Europe; and the legacy issues around banking debt. An
adviser serving in this government during this period commented that
the EMC changed the ‘ball game very substantially and the degree of
influence advisers have’ (personal interview). With the exit of the
troika, the EMC’s role diminished though it continued to provide a
template for organising discussions between ministers and senior
advisers on sensitive economic decisions with considerable political
ramifications, such as the water charges protest and Irish Water
debacle. Overall, the period 2011–14 resurrected the programme
manager role less formally and used the cabinet sub-committee system
for coordinating new policy, rather than a team of programme
managers working across government. Coalition coordination was
driven vertically from the centre, where at the top of the pyramid the
Taoiseach and Tánaiste’s senior team worked together with the
resources of the Department of the Taoiseach. Hence, although a
distinct inner core of advisers existed, namely chief of staffs and
programme managers (in all but name) serving the party leaders at the
core executive, there was no reform movement towards cabinetisation
or creating a separation from ministerial offices in departments by
introducing new structures staffed by advisers.
Conclusion 
Politically appointed staff work closely with ministers and interact with
civil servants in departments and across the executive. Their personal
selection very much depends on the support required by the particular
minister, and advisers deploy their skills accordingly. This is both a
strength and a weakness of the system and is challenging for reform.
Loyalty and trust are important dimensions in the relationship
between Irish ministers and special advisers but are difficult attributes
to justify in terms of public appointments. Both the selection and
performance of advisers continue to be regarded critically, as there is
an expectation that this staffing complement should demonstrably
bring added value, relevant expertise to the policymaking process and
an ability to learn ‘how government works’ in a short period of time. 
Until Ireland’s formal exit from the EC–ECB–IMF programme on
15 December 2013, the troika was an important focus of governance
arrangements. The discussion has considered the relevance of how
reform has been conceptualised in the international literature on
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advisers to the case of politically appointed advisers in Ireland serving
the Fine Gael/Labour coalition in 2011–16. The public service/adviser
bargain concept was used to frame an explanation of matters arising in
the political exchanges between advisers and their ministers, such as
loyalty, competence and responsibility. Issues arising in how advisers
work with ministers were incorporated into the government reform
agenda led by the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform,
namely in terms of considering their accountability relationships. In
contrast, the core executive analytical lens facilitated evaluations of
the relationships across government, and of how senior advisers
worked through particular structures and across parties to drive
reform and monitor the implementation of the programme for
government. 
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